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Social Values in Risk Acceptance 
-- 
Harry J. Otway, Philip D. Pahner, 
and Joanne Linnerooth* 
Since the dawn of civilization man has maintained a wary 
consciousness of the perils of his environment. However, until 
rather recently, the nature of these hazards did not change 
appreciably, their effects were limited to relatively small 
geographical areas and discrete time intervals. Thus, exposure 
to these hazards could, to some extent, be influenced by the 
actions or skills of the individual. 
The interest in risk assessment is owing to concerns about 
the dangers man has created for himself. In recent decades 
technological systems of unprecedented size have been developed 
and the side effects of these large scale systems are correspondlnyly 
larger, sometimes of world wide significance for extended time 
periods.1 A new category of risks which accompany the benefits 
provided by man's technology, has emerged. Here the actions and 
skills of the individual are essentially ineffective. 
The occurrence probabilities of many of these side effects 
are not accurately known because there has not been enough 
experience with these technologies to obtain statisitical measures 
of risk. Further, there are often uncertainities in the con- I 
sequences (should a specific side effect occur) because of an 1 
incomplete knowledge of the relevant natural laws necessary for 
prediction. Hafele [I 21 has referred to an age of "hypotheticall.t.y, " 
where theoretical estimates of risk must substitute for experience. 
The resulting societal response to these risks has been 
observed in the emergence of attitudes which tend to regard much 
that is new as being potentially harmful; the fundamental value 
of science to society is also being questioned. A variety of 
individual and group demands have been put forward for a closer 
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'some examples of side effects with global implications are 
potential changes in world climatology due to atmospheric pollu- 
tion, the global distribution of Krypton 85 and the interaction 
of aerosol spray propellants with the earth's azone layer. 
examination of the benefits and risks of technological innovations 
and, indeed, many such advances are encountering difficulties in 
gaining acceptance by the public. 
The nucleas energy field presents an excellent case study in 
risk assessment because the public response to these risks is, 
in many cases, providing a very real limitation to the development 
of nuclear power programmes. Further, the nuclear field provides 
many risk situations that are of research interest such as: 
examples of cost effective standard setting where operational 
risks may be reduced by control equipment expenditures; the possi- 
bility of large consequence, but infrequent, accidents; accident 
occurrence probabilities which can only be estimated, thus are 
highly uncertain; the non random distribution of risks and bene- 
fits to different groups of people; concerns about possible future 
(genetic) risks where benefits are realized at the present time. 
One of the prime objectives of the Joint IAEA/IIASA Research 
Project (hereafter the Joint Project) is to develop information 
on societal attitudes and response as inputs to decisions in 
areas such as: 
- the design of control and safety systems; 
- the development'of operational philosophies; 
- the setting of rational regulatory standards; 
- policy-level decisions on the selection and deployment 
of energy systems. 
Section I outlines the general structure of risk assessment, 
and in Section I1 the process of risk assessment as applied to 
technological systems, such as energy systems, is discussed. 
The research programme of the Joint Project is reported in Section 
I11 and some preliminary results are presented. Details of the 
Joint Project staffing and organization are presented in the 
Appendix. 
I. The General Structure of Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment has been suggested as a general term for 
the incorporation of risk concepts into the decision-making 
process (Otway [18]). Risk assessment has been defined as 
occuring in two stages (Otway [19]), risk estimating and risk 
evaluation, which will be discussed in detail in this section. 
- 
'pahner 124,251 has hypothesized that nuclear energy repre- 
sents a general example of societal concerns about technological 
development as well as a particular example of the psychological 
displacement of anxieties relating to the military uses of nuclear 
energy. 
The general structure of risk assessment is shown schematically 
in Figure 1 .  
Risk Estimation 
Risk estimation is the identification of the side effects 
of a decision and the subsequent estimation of their probabilities 
and the magnitude of the associated consequences. Some of the 
earliest formal risk assessments were made in the nuclear energy 
field by Siddall [2], Farmer [6], Beattie [7], and others 121, 
221. The most recent and comprehensive estimates are those of 
the "US Reactor Safety Study" [32] which treated risks from acci- 
dents in light water cooled nuclear power plants. An exampie of 
a risk estimated resuit from the "US Reactor Safety Study" may 
be seen in Figure 2, which shows fatalities from nuclear power 
plant accidents as a function of occurrence probability. 
In everyday usage risk is usually thought of as the pro- 
bability of an undesired occurrence, for example the risk of 
having an automobile accident. A more formal definition, often 
used, is that of statistically expected loss in value, for 
example the sum of all possible losses weighted by their occur- 
rence probabilities. Both definitions are inadequate because 
they do not include all of the information important in consid- 
ering risks, for example the magnitude of the consequences of 
infrequent  event^.^ In this paper, risk is defined as a func- 
tional combination of event probability, the uncertainty of the 
probability, the probability of a specific consequence given 
the fact that the event has occurred, and the uncertainty of 
this probability. This is shown in Figure 1 by the combination 
of event E and its consequence Cij to form risk R i j  For i 
specific situations this general definition may simplify into 
one of those mentioned earlier. 
Probability is an important variable in speaking of risk. 
The measurement of probability has a long history of academic 
debate (see Raiffa [27]). Definitions range from the classical 
notion that probability is the ratio of favourable occurrences 
to the total number of equally likely cases (for example the 
roll of a die or toss of a coin) to the subjective or judgmental 
view, which holds that probability measures one's degree of 
3 ~ h e  statistically expected value of loss for an activity 
having an accident probability of once per year with one fatality 
is the same as that for a situation where 1,000,000 fatalities 
may be expected with a probability of occurrence of one in 
1,000,000 per year, for example one fatality/year. The public 
reaction to these two situations is obviously different. 
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belief as measured by behaviour. Risk estimates might be con- 
sidered as ranging from objective to subjective; however, the 
technological risks which are of interest to us can never be 
estimated in a completely objective manner because the necessary 
data base does not exist. As pointed out by Fishburn [ 7 1 ,  
"all measurements of probability rely upon human judgement to 
some extent." What we would like to think of as objective 
estimates of risk because they are the product of careful calcu- 
lational procedures are only attempts to minimize subjective 
aspects through a more formal approach. The estimate of the 
layman that a risk is too high is the result of an intuitive 
approach to the same problem. The point is that these two 
extremes differ only in the degree of subjectivity involved and, 
therefore, have been identified in Figure 1 as formal and intui- 
tive methods rather than objective and subjective. 
Risk Evaluation 
Risk evaluation is the complex process of determining the 
meaning, or value, of the estimated risks to those affected, 
that is individual, group and society. This has been referred 
to by Hafele [ I l l  as the embedding of risks into the sociosphere. 
Evaluation may be thought of as a process of ranking, or ordering, 
of risks so that their total effects, both objective and sub- 
jective, may be compared. This process essentially defines the 
"acceptability" of risk. The embedding process is shown 
schematically in Figure 1 as a mapping of risk into ranking 
scales reflecting societal values toward risk situations. By 
using the definition of risk proposed earlier we take into 
account the fact that man is not indifferent to the nature of 
the event which results in a particular consequence. 
A feedback loop is shown through which actions reflecting 
social values may be taken in order to affect events or con- 
sequences. An example of this may be seen in the design of 
safety systems intended to prevent accidents or to limit the 
effects should they occur. 
One way of understanding value is by means of a scale 
which expresses the degree to which something satisfies intrinsic 
needs and desires--a measure of worth, importance or desirability. 
Ordinal scales rank items only in the order of preference, or 
the inverse, without regard to numerical quantities. A simple 
example might be an individual's statement that he prefers 
exposure to risk A over exposure to risk B, and so on. A 
cardinal ranking system provides numerical values for various 
(risk) prospects relative to an arbitrary scale. Here the rank 
orders of the ordinal scale are supplemented by numerical ratings 
which provide a better idea of just how strong a preference might 
be. 
Two basic methods of obtaining ranking scales are outlined 
in Figure 1. The first is based upon the analysis of statistical 
data to determine the preferences that society has shown in the 
past towards existing risks. The second is that of experiments 
(for example, psychometric surveys) to measure attitudes towards 
risks. The former yields information on past behaviour, the 
latter on present attitudes. 
The most elementary approach to obtaining rankings is to 
simply compile a table of accident statistics, such as Table 1 .  
A new risk is placed in perspective by comparing a formal estimate 
of risk with statistical data on existing, and therefore accepted, 
risks. A limitation of this method is that risk acceptance is 
situation dependent; many variables determine risk acceptance 
and they cannot be reflected in such comparisons. Figure 2 also 
shows a ranking of this type with the comparison being made among 
a group of involuntary risks of different types. Here the 
absolute magnitude of the hazard is also compared. 
Rankings determined by the analysis of statistical data 
have the advantage of being based upon actual behaviour. How- 
ever, they are limited by the assumption that past is prologue, 
that preferences revealed in the past will be valid in the 
future. This would not be expected to hold for technological 
risks because social values are changing with time--primarily 
owing to changes introduced by technology. Further, behaviour 
with respect, to risk acceptance is multiply determined, that is 
many factors influence the response to risks and all of these 
determinants are not even known, let alone clearly identified 
in the data base. 
Risk perception is important since the response to risk 
depends upon how situations are perceived, but statistical data 
report things as they were, for example accident rates, demo- 
graphic variables, public expenditure by categories. Some 
limitations of rankings based upon these revealed preferences 
are summarized in Otway [20]. At this point we may observe 
that evaluations of nuclear power risks madeby this method 
have indicated that nuclear power should be acceptable. However, 
experience has shown that this is not always the case. This 
indicates that revealed preferences could be useful in helping 
decide the risk levels that might be acceptable from an 
ethical point of view, but tell us little about what the public 
find acceptable. 
A distinction must be made between attitudes and behaviour. 
The former represent what one says, or thinks, his views are 
toward a given situation. Behaviour reflects his actions when 
actually encountering this situation. For example, most people 
would regard the telling of a lie as bad. In practice they might 
occasionally find it convenient to tell a lie in an embarrassing 
social situation. Rankings based upon psychometric surveys 
provide information on attitudes rather than behaviour, but the 
attitudes are measured at the present time. An example of a 
survey-determined ranking scale applied to the perception of 
health hazards may be found in Table 2 (see Wayler [ 3 4 1 )  . 
Table 1. An example of a rating scale comparing accident 
statistics (USA, 1966) and theoretical estimates. 
Type of Accident 
Total Probability of Death 
Deaths per Person per Year 
Motor Vehicle 
Falls 
Fire and Explosion 
Drowning 
Firearms 
Poisoning 
Solids and Liquids 
Gases and Vapours 
Machinery 
Water Transport 
Aircraft 
Inhalation and Ingestion 
of Food 
Falling or Projected Object 
Mechanical Suffocation 
Therapeutic Medical and 
Surgical Procedures 
Railway (Except Motor 
Vehicle) 
Electric Current 
Hot Substance, Corrosive 
Liquid, Steam 
Animals (Nonvenomous) 
Lightning 
Venomous Animals and Insects 
Streetcar 
Radiation 
100 Nuclear Power Plants 
(estimated) 
Table 2. An example of a survey-determined rating scale 
(seriousness of illness rating scale). 
Rank Mean Score 
Leukemia 
Cancer 
Multiple Sclerosis 
Heart Attack 
Muscular Dystrophy 
Stroke 
Blindness 
Chest Pain 
Peptic Ulcer 1 
Syphilis 
Pneumonia 
Irregular Heart Beats 
Whooping Cough 
Measles 
Acne 
Common Cold 
Dandruff 
1 Modulus item. 
In summary, we have two methods for risk evaluation avail- 
able to us: preferences and controlled experiments. The former 
measures past behaviour; it is difficult, however, to anticipate 
future behaviour based upon observations of past behaviour. 
The latter provides information on attitudes at the present 
moment; the problem here is one of anticipating behaviour based 
upon attitude measurements. 
The Determinants of Social Values 
The location of a specific risk in a ranking scale is 
multiply determined; many factors, conscious and unconscious, 
are involved. We have already mentioned voluntary versus 
involuntary exposure to risk and that virtually all technological 
risks, in which we are interested, are essentially involuntary. 
People react to a threat based upon what they perceive it 
to be, not necessarily upon what it actually is. Intuitively 
derived probability estimates, and therefore risk estimates, 
tend to be inaccurate due to the effect of psychologically 
determined factors (see Edwards [5] and Murphy [ I  71 ) which 
influence perception. There has been little research in the 
behavioural sciences on attitudes and beliefs with respect to 
the perception and acceptance of technological risks. As a 
result there is no body of behavioural theory from which to 
seek guidance. Therefore, identification of the factors deter- 
mining risk perception and the knowlege of their relative 
importance is a priority research item. This information 
would allow the incorporation of new risk situations into 
existing rankinq scales without trial and error experience or 
detailed surveys. Risk acceptance would then be within the 
reach of predictability. 
11. The Process of Risk Assessment: Technoloqical Systems 
Figure 3 introduces social dynamics into the structure of 
risk assessment &eveloped in the last section. This process 
includes the contributions of three social.groups: the sponsor 
who proposes a technological development, the public for whom 
the benefit is intended, and the regulator who has the responsi- 
bility of balancing the needs of both groups.4 In the following 
discussion the numbers in parentheses refer to the respective 
boxes in Figure 3. 
The Sponsor 
The process starts with a societal need which may be satis- 
fied by some proposed application of technology. For example, 
4~igure 3 closely parallels the structural hypothesis of 
mental mechanisms proposed in Freud [ 8 1 .  
SPONSOR 
Formal Assessments 
REGULATOR 
' Resolution of Formal and  
I I n tu i t i ve  Processes 
I PUBLIC 
I In tu i t ive Assessments 
NOTE : I 
Perceptual processes-, , -, Problem 
Information,Action processes- 
I B,E,C.lbl 
B,E,C,  8 .0 '  -I---------.---- _I 
F i g u r e  3 .  The p r o c e s s  o f  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t :  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s y s t e m s .  
-- - 
energy needs met by the construction of a power plant. The 
sponsor may perceive the proposal (Box 1) as a design problem 
(Box 12). In his design he must ensure that the required bene- 
fit is provided and that any potential side effects meet regula- 
tory standards. These side effects are characterized by events, 
E (such as accidents), and their consequences, C, which must 
be considered in the design. 
Figure 3 also introduces the concept of an unknown set, B, 
of potential events or characteristics which could actually 
occur but cannot be included in design considerations because 
their existence has not yet been discovered. An additional 
"inverse" unknown set, B, has also been postulated to represent 
those events and consequences which have been imagined by the 
designer but could, in fact, be proved impossible if natural 
laws were perfectly known. Regulatory agencies may require 
situations to be considered in design which are unrealistic; 
this is done in order to provide safety margins. These also 
form part of the inverse unknown set. 
The design of the sponsor (Box 13) may proceed in the tradi- 
tional, deterministic manner in which design base limits are 
assumed for E and C. Safety systems are engineered which will 
allow adherence to regulatory standards should the design basis 
situation occur. An alternative design method is the probabi- 
listic approach which does not employ artificial design limits. 
There are no limits to the events and consequences considered; 
however, they are weighted by their probabilities and risks are 
kept to acceptable levels through reliability design. Which- 
ever design method is chosen the reliability of systems is 
fixed, either directly or indirectly. Reliability combined with 
operational philosophy (Box 14) determines the risks to which 
the public is exposed. The designer's perceptions of the rele- 
vant social values are also considered in the design process. 
Hafele [13] discusses these design processes in detail. 
The Public 
The public perceives the proposal (Box 1) as a potential 
source of societal benefit and risk (Box 22). Their intuitive 
estimates of risk can include allowances for the unknown set, 8, 
of things possible but not considered in design. These allowances 
'are not based upon superior technical knowlege but may be 
expressed simply as a lack of confidence in the designers, 
operators or regulatory authorities. An inverse unknown set, B ,  
of things that cannot happen based upon natural laws may also 
be considered. An example of this is the fear of some that 
nuclear power plants may explode as atomic bombs. As unrealistic 
as such concerns might be they still influence the perception 
of risk. The public and the designer consider different inverse 
unknown sets; this reflects different conceptual frameworks. 
The expe r i ence  of t h e  p u b l i c  has  determined t h e i r  v a l u e s  o r  
a t t i t u d e s  (Box 2 3 )  towards r i s k s .  The perce ived  r i s k s  a r e  i n t u i -  
t i v e l y  i nco rpo ra t ed  i n t o  t h i s  system of  va lue s  which can  be 
measured by means of t h e  rank ing  s c a l e s  r e f e r r e d  t o  e a r l i e r .  
P r e f e r ences  r e l a t e d  t o  r i s k  accep tance  (Box 2 4 )  e x i s t  on ly  when 
r evea l ed  by behaviour .  Thus l i n e s  of  a c t i o n  a r e  shown i n  F i g u r e  
3  l e ad ing  from Box 2 4  i n t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  s e c t o r .  
The Regula to r  
Regula tory  f u n c t i o n s  occur  on s e v e r a l  l e v e l s .  One i s  t h e  
agency r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  s e t t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  (Box 3 4 )  t o  r e g u l a t e  
s p e c i f i c  environmenta l  e f f e c t s  which may a r i s e  from, f o r  example, 
r a d i o a c t i v e ,  the rmal ,  o r  chemical  r e l e a s e s .  Standard  s e t t i n g  
t a k e s  i n t o  account  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  environmenta l  i n s u l t s  a s  p r e -  
d i c t e d  by n a t u r a l  laws and t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  of t h e  r e l e v a n t  s o c i a l  
v a l u e s  (Box 2 3 ) .  I f  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  incompat ib le  w i th  s o c i a l  v a l u e s  
t h e n  s o c i e t a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  may be expressed by a c t i v e  demands t h a t  
s t a n d a r d s  be changed ( t h e  a c t i o n  l i n e  from Box 2 4  t o  Box 3 4 ) .  
Another l e v e l  of t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  p roces s  i s  one where a  d e c i s i o n  
must be  t aken ,  under c o n d i t i o n s  of  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  r ega rd ing  
approva l  of t h e  p roposa l  (Box 3 5 ) .  Thi s  d e c i s i o n  might r e q u i r e  
changes i n  t h e  p roposa l ,  de s ign  o r  o p e r a t i o n  and could  be appealed 
by s o c i e t a l  a c t i o n  (Box 2 4 ) .  The f i n a l  r e g u l a t o r y  s t e p  which, 
depending upon t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p roces s  might i n c l u d e  t h e  j u d i c i a r y ,  
i s  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  of t h e  formal  r i s k  assessment  of  t h e  sponsor  
and t h e  i n t u i t i v e  r i s k  assessment  of t h e  p u b l i c .  For  s i m p l i c i t y ,  , 
t h e s e  r e g u l a t o r y  f u n c t i o n s  have been shown a s  one s t e p  i n  Box 3 5 .  1 
Summary 
Repor ts  such a s  t h e  "US Reactor  S a f e t y  Study" [321  s e r v e  
a  v a l u a b l e ~ f u n c t i o n  i n  fo rma l i z ing  t h e  e s t i m a t i n g  of  r i s k s  t o  
which t h e  p u b l i c  i s  exposed. Such work would a l s o  a l l ow  t h e  
de t e rmina t i on  of  t h e  system r e l i a b i l i t i e s  neces sa ry  t o  s a t i s f y  
s t a n d a r d s  based upon r i s k  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  The emphasis h e r e  i s  
upon formal  r i s k  e s t i m a t e s  which correspond t o  Boxes 1 3  and 1 4  
of F igu re  3 .  
The work o f  t h e  J o i n t  P r o j e c t  i s  d i r e c t e d  towards g a i n i n g  
a  b e t t e r  unders tand ing  of t h e  p e r c e p t u a l  p roces se s  shown i n  
F igu re  3 .  T h i s  would a l l ow  in format ion  on s o c i e t a l  a t t i t u d e s  
(Box 2 3 )  t o  be i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  de s ign  and s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g .  The 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  d e c i s i o n  making p roces s  (Box 3 5 )  
would a l s o  be reduced.  
111. Research Proaramme and P re l im ina rv  R e s u l t s  
The r e s e a r c h  a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  J o i n t  P r o j e c t  may be d i v i d e d  
i n t o  f i v e  s u b t a s k s ,  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p roces s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igu re  
3 ,  which w i l l  be  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  P r e l im ina ry  r e s u l t s  
will be briefly summarized, readers are referred to the referenced 
publications for details. 
Advanced Methods in Risk Estimatina 
Owing to the relatively small statistical data base it is 
difficult to make risk estimates for low frequency, large consequence 
accidents such as those that might occur in nuclear power facilities. 
Mathematical techniques, such as fuzzy set theory, are being 
applied to making macroscopic risk estimates which may then be 
compared with estimates based upon microscopic techniques such as 
accident/fault tree analysis (see Shinohara [281). This work 
represents a supplement to the methodologies used in the "US 
Reactor Safety Study" [32]. 
The Application of Risk Benefit Princi~les to Standard Settinq 
An important factor in standard setting is that of expressing 
disparate variables in consistent units so that comparisons may 
be made between risk reduction and its cost. This is especially 
difficult in the case of activities which involve risk to human 
life. The Pareto theoretical approach is being adapted to the 
evaluation of such risks and the possibility of using Pareto 
criteria for the treatment of statistically and nonstatistically 
distributed risks is being examined. The effects of further 
variations are also being considered in this theoretical work, 
for example the question of genetic risks that occur in the 
future where the benefits are short term and are taken by the 
present generation. 
A survey has been made which concentrates upon practice 
(mainly in France and the USA) in evaluating public projects 
involving life saving (see Linnerooth [16]). Further a review of 
theoretical models for determining the "value" of mortality 
.risk in decisionmaking has been completed (see Linnerooth [14]). 
These theoretical treatments have been applied to nuclear power 
plant economics (Linnerooth [ 1 5 ] )  and the problem of quantifying 
environmental risks (Cohen [4] ) . 
An application was made to the treatment of tritium and 
krypton 85 in nuclear facilities (Cohen [ 2 , 3 ] ) .  This work 
indicates that, based upon the number of publications on the 
health and safety effects of these two isotopes, more attention 
has been given to the control of tritium releases. However, as 
seen in Figure 4, the world wide radiation dose from tritium 
released in the nuclear industry is not only less than that from 
krypton, but it is smaller than that from naturally occuring 
tritium and far smaller than that due to residual tritium from 
weapons testing. This means that adding controls to further 
reduce tritium releases from the nuclear industry would hardly 
change the total tritium dose. 
19~1 1980 7990 2000 
Y E A R  
F i g u r e  4 .  Whole body d o s e  from b i o s p h e r i c  
a c c u m u l a t i o n .  
Since there is essentially no krypton background level, 
krypton controls would have a direct effect. These dose cal- 
culations are summarized in Figure 4. An estimate of the cost 
of reducing tritium releases by 50%, using current technology, 
is about $170,000 per man-rem of radiation exposure avoided. 
A comparable cost for reduction in krypton releases would be 
about $10 per man-rem. The theoretical considerations mentioned 
earlier would indicate that $200 is a reasonable expenditure 
for the avoidance of one man-rem of whole body irradition. 
The conclusion here is that further consideration might be given 
by the nuclear industry to the relative expenditures for control 
of these two isotopes. 
The Perception of Risks 
The perception of risks is a crucial factor in determining 
attitudes. Obviously people respond to a threatening situation 
based upon what they perceive it to be rather than what it might 
actually be. An effort is therefore being made to develop 
survey techniques for determining how various types of risk are 
perceived. A further goal is the identification of the variables 
which influence risk perception and the determination of their 
relative importance. 
A survey has been done in Austria (Otway [231) as a replica- 
tion of one previously done in Canada (Golant and Burton [9], 
to obtain ordinal rankings for various hazard situations. The 
objectives of the Austrian study were primarily to gain experience 
in administering this type of survey and to develop computer 
programmes for data analysis. A secondary objective was to make 
a cross cultural comparison of risk perception. 
The overall cross cultural rank size correlation coefficient 
for the two groups was found to be r = 0.62. In the Canadian 
group the effect of the experience with specific risks was found 
to be most important in determining response (experienced 
respondents versus inexperienced, r = 0.45). This was not found 
in the Austrian sample (r = 0.81) where the most important 
determinant of risk perception was found to be the subjects self- 
rated ability to imagine themselves in particular risk situations 
("good" imaginability versus "poor", r = 0.59). This latter 
result is conjectually interesting in the case of nuclear power 
plant risks where imagination must substitute for experience and 
difficulty in imagining a specific hazard correlates with the 
higher ranking of that hazard. 
A further preliminary survey (Swaton [31]), designed to be 
less culturally dependent by using pictures of risk situations, 
confirmed by factor analysis that the most important determinant 
of risk perception is the active-passive dimension. That is, 
risks such as technological risks where the individual has no 
control over outcome or exposure tend to be ranked higher. This 
study is being refined to look for determinants of perception 
in a group of only passive risk situations. This is a collabora- 
tive effort with the University of Vienna Institute of Psychology. 
Preferences Related to Risk Acceptance 
Starr [30] postulated some determinants of risk behaviour 
based upon the analysis of national accident statistics. This 
work developed a philosophical basis for risk assessment and 
served to draw attention to the importance of such research. 
Based upon these analyses Starr suggested three major determinants 
of risk acceptance and assigned weightings to them. The major 
points were: "(1) The indications are that the public is willing 
to accept 'voluntary' risks roughly 1000 times greater than 
'involuntary' risks. ( 2 )  The statistical risk of death from 
disease appears to be a psychological yardstick for establishing 
the level of acceptability of other risks. (3) The acceptability 
of risk appears to be crudely proportional to the third power 
of the benefits (real or imagined) . . . . " 
The methodology used was reviewed and an attempt was made 
to reproduce the Starr results (Otway [20]). The results could 
not be reproduced using this method and it was concluded that, 
while the Starr hypothesis regarding the identification of these 
determinants (at least (1) and (3) above) was probably philoso- 
phically correct, the results could not be justified on the basis 
of his analysis. It was further concluded that the mathematical 
relationships indicating the relative importance of the deter- 
minants must be regarded as unlikely. 
Further efforts in this direction will concentrate upon 
the combination of statistical analysis and behavioural theories 
employing an iterative process of empirical, multivariable 
analysis. This work is a collaborative effort with the Study 
Group for International Analyses, Vienna. 
Information Transmission and Group Dynamics 
The communication of scientific information plays a role in 
the development of societal attitudes, as shown in Figure 3. 
Groups serve a mediating function between the individual and the 
larger society, because the individual interacts with society 
through his membership in various groups, for example family, 
professional, fraternal, etc. Therefore, an understanding of 
group dynamics is important in learning how individual attitudes 
and preferences are aggregated to form attitutdes at the societal 
level shown in Figure 3. In the case of nuclear power plants 
it has been observed that until a project is made known there 
is no immediate concern about nuclear hazards amongst most 
inhabitants of the area. Once the plans are announced, people 
soon become acquainted with thinking about the possible threats, 
real or imagined; they are forced by circumstances to form 
relevant opinions. The project then starts being judged on a 
number of levels: individual, group, community, national and 
perhaps even international. As the responses to the proposal 
gradually emerge it has been noted that various interest groups 
start to form, develop their sources of information and, in 
many cases, work actively to promote or oppose the proposed 
facility. 
As a preliminary step in understanding this problem, risk 
phenomena in traditional, small-scale societies have been 
analyzed (Linnerooth [16]) to aid in the construction of models 
of this process. The observation of several interest group 
situations has allowed the derivation of a set of typical interest 
group characteristics (Pahner [26]). A systems analysis 
application to nuclear power plant siting has been published 
(Gros [lo]). Models of interest group dynamics in modern 
societies are being constructed in collaboration with the European 
Centre for Social Welfare Training and Research (Vienna) through 
an analysis of several nuclear power plant siting controversies. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The intent of this paper was to emphasize the importance of 
risk assessment research in providing information necessary for 
decisions regarding the selection, design, deployment, and 
operation of technological systems such as energy systems. It 
is not yet possible to present results which describe human 
behaviour in risk situations. The measurement of social values 
is a complex problem where little work has been done. Plans for 
further research and some preliminary results have been 
presented. 
APPENDIX 
The Joint IAEA/IIASA Research Project was formed in mid- 
1974 pursuant to an agreement between the Director General of 
the IAEA and the Director of IIASA. Organizationally the Joint 
Project comes under the IAEA Department of Technical Operations, 
Division of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Protection and the 
Energy Systems Project of IIASA. 
As of July 1 9 7 5  the project consisted of eight professional 
and two general services staff. The IAEA provides the project 
leader and general service staff, and IIASA provided three 
scientists. IAEA Member States (the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America) have indicated their interest in this work by providing 
seconded scientists on a cost-free basis. 
Additional scientific collaboration is obtained through 
IAEA-sponsored research contracts with the University of Vienna 
Institute of Psychology, the Study Group for International 
Analyses and the European Centre for Social Welfare Training 
and Research. 
The following disciplines are represented in the Joint 
Project: Physics, Public Health, Systems ~ngineering, Economics, 
Anthropology, Psychiatry/Medicine, Psychology, and Sociology. 
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